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Asymmetries in Immigration
Protection
Sabrineh Ardalan†
INTRODUCTION
Current procedures afford immigrants in the United
States with prior removal orders fewer protections than those
who have already been deported and seek to reenter—ostensibly
on the assumption that the former have had their day in court.
Yet that is not often the case.
Indeed, immigrants are deported every day without
having their potential claims to relief fully explored.1 Many who
fear persecution or torture in their home countries are ordered
removed in absentia, meaning without their presence in court.
Such deportations happen for a variety of reasons, including lack
of proper notice of scheduled hearing dates or confusion and fear
about the process of seeking protection in the United States.2
† Clinical Professor of Law, Harvard Law School and Director, Harvard
Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program; B.A., Yale; J.D., Harvard Law School. I
would like to thank the participants of the 2015 Emerging Immigration Law Scholars
Conference, the 2015 Clinical Law Review Workshop, as well as the 2016 New England
Clinical Conference. Special thanks to Muneer Ahmed, Susannah Barton Tobin, Richard
Boswell, Jason Cade, Kate Evans, Johan Fatemi, Lindsay Harris, Mary Holper, Tally
Kritzman-Amir, Shalini Bhargava Ray, Rachel Settlage, and Cara Solomon for their
helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this article. I am grateful to Maria Manghi for her
excellent research assistance.
1 This article will not focus on the flaws in the U.S. summary deportation
system, given the robust scholarship and extensive human rights reporting on that topic.
See infra Parts II, III. For further discussion of the numerous due process and human
rights violations presented by summary deportation procedures, see, e.g., Jennifer Lee
Koh, When Shadow Removals Collide, 96 WASH. U. L. REV 337 (2018) [hereinafter Koh,
When Shadow Removals Collide]; Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of
Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (2017) [hereinafter Koh, Removal in the
Shadows]; Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportation and the Role of
Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1 (2014); Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the
Immigration Adjudication Problem, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 595, 624–32 (2009).
2 See, e.g., Julia Preston, Fearful of Court, Asylum Seekers Are Banished in
Absentia, MARSHALL PROJECT (July 30, 2017), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/
07/30/fearful-of-court-asylum-seekers-are-deported-in-absentia [https://perma.cc/3AB8-94
VC] (noting that “[o]f nearly 100,000 parents and children who have come before the courts
since 2014, most asking for refuge, judges have issued rulings in at least 32,500 cases”—of
which “[t]he majority—[seventy] percent—ended with deportation orders in absentia,
pronounced by judges to empty courtrooms” and explaining that “[m]any immigrants did
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Others are ordered removed without the opportunity to fully
present their fears of return to an immigration judge due to
trauma, lack of representation, or other barriers.3
Until recently, immigration officials had often allowed
such immigrants with unexecuted removal orders to remain in
the United States for years.4 President Trump’s January 25, 2017
Executive Order 13768, Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior
of the United States,5 along with his administration’s subsequent
rescission of the Obama-era “enforcement priorities”6 in February
2017, upended that longstanding policy and practice.7
The Executive Order included in its expansive list of
enforcement targets immigrants who are subject to final orders of
removal but who have not yet departed. The memorandum
implementing the order underscored that “prosecutorial discretion
shall not be exercised in a manner that exempts or excludes a
specified class or category of [individuals] from enforcement of the
immigration laws.”8 The effects of these policy changes are now
readily apparent: a 42% increase in immigration arrests from
January 25, 2017 through the end of the fiscal year, September 30,

not understand what they were supposed to do to pursue their claims and could not connect
with lawyers to guide them”).
3 See id. (describing, inter alia, the case of Maria Arita, who fled Honduras in
2013 with her three-year-old son, because gang members had targeted her and her
family because of her family membership, and noting that the lawyer she had found and
paid several thousand dollars “dropped her case” so she represented herself and her son
in court unsuccessfully).
4 See Amy Taxin, Under Trump, Old Deportations Orders Get New Life, PBS
NEWS HOUR (June 8, 2017, 10:36 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-olddeportation-orders-get-new-life [https://perma.cc/JE9A-XDM6] (“For years, immigrants
facing deportation have been allowed to stay in the U.S. provided they show up for
regular check-ins with federal deportation agents and stay out of trouble. . . . Now, in
cases spanning from Michigan to California, some of these immigrants are being told
their time here is up. Immigrants who already have deportation orders and were allowed
to stay in the country under the prior administration have become a target . . . .”).
5 Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order
No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
6 Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, et al. at 5 (Nov. 20,
2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_disc
retion.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZP9-LL4G]. The Obama administration’s enforcement efforts
focused on immigrants it identified as posing a threat to national or border security or public
safety. Immigration officials considered mitigating factors such as presence in the U.S. from
a young age, family and social ties, age, and health conditions in determining whether to
exercise discretion in allowing immigrants to remain in the U.S. See id. at 1, 5–6.
7 See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8800; Memorandum from John Kelly,
Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs and Border
Prot., et al. at 2 (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_022
0_S1_Implementing-the-Presidents-Border-Security-Immigration-Enforcement-Improveme
nt-Policies.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YTQ-L6B4] [hereinafter Memorandum from John Kelly].
8 Memorandum from John Kelly, supra note 7, at 4; see Exec. Order No. 13768,
82 Fed. Reg. at 8800.
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2017,9 and a 31% increase in the number of people ordered removed
by federal immigration courts during the first six months of the
Trump administration, as compared to the previous year.10
Across the country, news outlets are increasingly
reporting the arrest and deportation of longtime community
members.11 In one case, a Yale College student’s father, Melecio
Andazola Morales, who had lived in the United States for almost
twenty years, was deported to Mexico based on a prior removal
order when his daughter petitioned for his green card;12 in
another, an Ohio businessman, Amer Adi Othman, husband of a
U.S. citizen and father of four U.S. citizen daughters, who had
lived in the United States for almost forty years, was deported to
Jordan just two weeks after he was arrested based on a prior
deportation order.13 Under current procedures, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) can quickly remove such individuals
from the country without a hearing.14

9 U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FISCAL YEAR 2017 ICE ENFORCEMENT
AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT, at 2–3 (2017). For an in-depth discussion of the changes

in enforcement priorities and effects of the new policies under the Trump administration, see
AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, THE END OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES UNDER
THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/
sites/default/files/research/the_end_of_immigration_enforcement_priorities_under_the_tru
mp_administration.pdf [https://perma.cc/7T3H-JQDS].
10 Maria Sacchetti, Deportation Orders Up Under Trump, Fewer Prevail in
Immigration Court, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
immigration/deportation-orders-up-under-trump-fewer-prevail-in-immigration-court/20
17/08/08/d3f0a6a6-7c74-11e7-9d08-b79f191668ed_story.html [https://perma.cc/KAT4-Y
YJS] (noting that during the period from February 1, 2017 to July 31, 2017, “judges
issued 73,127 final immigration decisions, an increase of 14.5 percent over the same
period in 2016. Of those decisions, 49,983 were deportation orders, an increase of nearly
28 percent from the same period in 2016” and “[t]he rest were orders to leave the United
States voluntarily”).
11 See, e.g., Taxin, supra note 4.
12 See Britton O’Daly, Melecio Deported to Mexico, YALE DAILY NEWS (Dec. 18,
2017, 2:03 AM), https://yaledailynews.com/blog/2017/12/18/melecio-deported-to-mexico/
[https://perma.cc/N2ZX-R9CD]; Britton O’Daly, Father of Yale Undergraduate Detained
for Deportation, YALE DAILY NEWS (Oct. 13, 2017, 10:32 PM), https://yaledailynews.
com/blog/2017/10/13/father-of-yale-undergraduate-detained-for-deportation/ [https://per
ma.cc/5P2Z-P7TL].
13 See Tal Kopan, How Trump Changed the Rules to Arrest More Non-Criminal
Immigrants, CNN (Mar. 2, 2018, 9:02 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/02/politics/iceimmigration-deportations/index.html [https://perma.cc/MM23-X3QT] (“A businessman and
father from Ohio. An Arizona mother. The Indiana husband of a Trump supporter. They were
unassuming members of their community, parents of US citizens and undocumented. And
they were deported by the Trump administration.”); see also Vivian Yee, A Marriage Used to
Prevent Deportation. Not Anymore, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/04/19/us/immigration-marriage-green-card.html [https://perma.cc/BNE9-5E2N] (noting
that “[i]mmigration lawyers in New England, in particular, say there has been an
unmistakable swell in the number of clients arrested at marriage interviews”).
14 For a discussion of “shadow removals” and “speed deportations,” see
generally Koh, When Shadow Removals Collide, supra note 1; Koh, Removal in the
Shadows, supra note 1; Wadhia, supra note 1.
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This article identifies a critical gap in the existing doctrine
on screening procedures and literature on enforcement and
deportations, namely the lack of protections for those with prior
unexecuted removal orders who fear return to their home
countries. For these immigrants, the only recourse is a motion to
reopen the prior removal case. Such motions are, however, subject
to time and numeric limitations, as well as restrictions on the
legal basis for filing. As a result, they are difficult, if not
impossible, to win.15 The current system thus improperly
prioritizes efficiency and finality of proceedings over the United
States’ obligations under domestic and international law not to
return people to countries where they face persecution or torture.
In so doing, the system fails to safeguard due process rights,
provide access to fundamentally fair proceedings, and ensure that
equal protection principles are not violated for all immigrants.16
Take the cases of Alberto and Manuel.17 Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) officials arrested Alberto reentering the
United States after having previously deported him to Honduras.
When he expressed a fear of return to his home country, CBP sent
him to a detention facility for a “reasonable fear” screening in
order to determine whether he should be allowed to file for
humanitarian protection in immigration court.18 In contrast,
when ICE officials apprehended Manuel, who had lived in the
United States for years, based on an old unexecuted in absentia
removal order, they did not screen him for a fear of return. They
detained him and quickly prepared to deport him. His only option,
15 ASYLUM SEEKER ADVOCACY PROJECT & CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGRATION
NETWORK, INC., DENIED A DAY IN COURT: THE GOVERNMENT’S USE OF IN ABSENTIA
REMOVAL ORDERS AGAINST FAMILIES SEEKING ASYLUM 10–11 (2018).
16 The immigration court backlog is a reason often cited by government officials
for prioritizing efficiency and finality. Yet recent policy decisions have only exacerbated
that backlog by attempting to eliminate immigration judges’ authority to utilize basic
docket management tools, such as continuing cases pending with the U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Service (USCIS) and administratively closing cases. See Immigration
Court Backlog Jumps While Case Processing Slows, TRACIMMIGRATION (June 8, 2018),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/516/ [https://perma.cc/XAM5-YY4C] (“As of the
end of May 2018, the number of cases waiting decision reached an all-time high of
714,067. This compares with a court backlog of 542,411 cases at the end of January 2017
when President Trump assumed office. During his term the backlog has increased by
almost a third (32%) with 171,656 more cases added.”).
17 These vignettes are based on experiences of Harvard Immigration and
Refugee Clinical Program clients and their family members. Names, details, and
identifying information have been changed to protect confidentiality.
18 As noted infra, the reasonable fear screening process is itself flawed in
practice and does not always function in this way, as the Immigration and Nationality
Act and accompanying regulations dictate. See infra Part II; Lindsay M. Harris,
Withholding Protection, COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV., Spring 2019, at 1, 8–10. Additionally,
as explained infra, the reinstatement proceedings into which individuals are placed only
provides an opportunity to apply for withholding of removal and protection under CAT,
not asylum. See infra Part IV.
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given his fear of return to Guatemala as an indigenous man, was
to file a motion to reopen—a long shot in most cases. Against all
odds, he won and the immigration court reopened his case. Many
do not and are deported to persecution, torture, or even death.19
Because of how and when they are apprehended by immigration
authorities, immigrants in Manuel and Alberto’s positions are
accorded starkly different protections. This article explores this
unjustified distinction.
The United States implemented the reasonable fear
screening procedure as a safety valve20 in the draconian21
reinstatement of removal context to bring the United States into
compliance with its obligations under the Refugee Convention
and Convention Against Torture (CAT).22 However, this
19 This article focuses on the reasonable fear process, not the credible fear
process, given the extensive scholarship and advocacy to date on the credible fear
process. See generally Memorandum from Bill Ong Hing, Professor of Law, Univ. of S.F.
Sch. of Law, to John Lafferty, Chief, Asylum Div., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Serv. (Apr. 21, 2014), http://static.squarespace.com/static/50b1609de4b054abacd5ab6c/
t/53558353e4b02071f74ee3c4/1398113107754/Re%20sponse%20to%20USCIS%20Credi
ble%20Fear%20Memo,%20Bill%20Hing,%2004.21.2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/CR64-6
EMK] (critiquing USCIS’s revised credible fear lesson plan).
20 I have adopted this term from Jill Family’s work. See Family, supra note 1.
21 Those individuals who seek reentry after having been previously deported are
improperly accorded more limited protections than first-time arrivals: they are only eligible
for withholding of removal under the Refugee Convention and CAT, not asylum. As noted,
infra Part II, this issue has been litigated. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae American
Immigration Lawyers Association et al., Perez-Guzman v. Holder, No. 13-70579 (9th Cir. Apr.
9, 2014) (arguing that individuals subject to reinstatement of removal should be allowed to
apply for asylum, as well as withholding of removal and protection under CAT). An in-depth
discussion of why the failure to afford individuals who go through the reasonable fear process
access to asylum violates both international law and due process is, however, outside the
scope of this article. See Harris, supra note 18, at 10–12.
22 Although the current reasonable fear screening process is itself flawed in
practice—a failure the government itself has recognized—it is nonetheless an important
mechanism, even if it requires improvement. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.,
OIG-15-95, STREAMLINE: MEASURING ITS EFFECT ON ILLEGAL BORDER CROSSING, at 16
(May 15, 2015) [hereinafter OIG REPORT] (“Border Patrol does not have guidance on
whether to refer to Streamline prosecution aliens who express fear of persecution or fear
of return to their home countries. As a result, Border Patrol agents sometimes use
Streamline to refer aliens expressing such fear to DOJ for prosecution. Using Streamline
to refer aliens expressing fear of persecution, prior to determining their refugee status,
may violate U.S. obligations under the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, which the United States ratified in 1968.”); Notice of Proposed
Settlement and Hearing in Class Action Involving Detained Non-Citizens Who Are
Awaiting a “Reasonable Fear Determination,” Alfaro Garcia v. Johnson, 14-cv-01775
(N.D. Cal. 2015) (determining that in compliance with regulations, ICE must refer
individuals who qualify for reasonable fear determinations within five days on average,
and USCIS must conduct the determination within ten days on average; if the
government takes longer than twenty days, it must notify class counsel); see also Practice
Advisory for Alfaro Garcia v. Johnson, NAT’L IMMIGR. JUST. CTR. (2015), https://www.
aclunc.org/docs/20151027-summary_of_alfaro_settlement_practice_advisory.pdf
[https://perma.cc/22XN-8JTD]. An in-depth discussion of prolonged detention and other
flaws in the reasonable fear process is outside the scope of this article. For further
discussion, see Denise Gilman, Realizing Liberty: The Use of International Human
Rights Law to Realign Immigration Detention in the United States, 36 FORDHAM INT’L
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procedure is not currently accessible to those like Manuel with
unexecuted removal orders. This article highlights a pressing
need to revisit this procedure in order to ensure it is applied
equitably to both sets of people—those who were previously
removed and reenter and those who reside in the United States
with unexecuted removal orders—as a safeguard for the rights
of all those who fear return to their home countries.
The article argues that before deporting individuals with
unexecuted removal orders, the U.S. government should provide
reasonable fear screenings in accordance with domestic and
international law. Without such a screening mechanism, the United
States risks returning such individuals to serious harm, torture, or
even death. Other state parties to the Convention, including
Canada, already engage in a type of pre-removal risk assessment.
The addition of this type of screening mechanism to the U.S. system
would be an important step toward adhering to non-refoulement
obligations under domestic and international law.23
The article first explores U.S. obligations under domestic
and international law to provide protection to those who fear
return to persecution and torture. Next, the article highlights the
shortcomings of the current system in meeting those obligations
and suggests that due process and equal protection require
expansion of current reasonable fear procedures to provide a
uniform and equitable pre-removal risk assessment process. It
concludes with prescriptions for amending the current reasonable
fear screening process to improve its efficacy and expand its scope
to allow all those with prior removal orders (whether
apprehended after reentry or apprehended having never left) to
apply for protection. Addressing the critical gap in U.S.
regulations would bring the U.S. system into compliance with its
longstanding duty not to return individuals to countries where
they face persecution or torture.

L.J. 243, 309–10 (2013) (“[F]or individuals who claim persecution while awaiting
deportation under reinstatement of removal, detention pending the reasonable fear
interview violates international human rights standards, at least as the process is
currently carried out. . . . Current practice regarding detention after a favorable
reasonable fear interview also violates international human rights standards.
Individuals who do not pass the reasonable fear interview might be detained, if execution
of the confirmed removal order were rapid, without violating international law. However,
individuals who have passed the reasonable fear interview fall clearly within the
category of persons pending a determination of their immigration status and so may only
be detained in limited circumstances.”).
23 See infra Part IV.
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U.S. NON-REFOULEMENT OBLIGATIONS UNDER
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

The current practice of deporting individuals with
unexecuted removal orders absent a systematic mechanism for
evaluating their fears of return contravenes longstanding U.S.
obligations under both domestic and international law. In order
to meet its obligations, the United States must implement
procedures to screen for a fear of return prior to forcible return
to countries where individuals face serious human rights
violations, torture, or even death. This Part addresses, in turn,
U.S. non-refoulement obligations under both domestic and
international law, which can and should inform U.S. approaches
to safeguarding immigrants.24
A.

Non-Refoulement Obligations Under Domestic Law

When the United States signed and ratified the 1967
Protocol to the Refugee Convention25 over fifty years ago, it
committed to provide surrogate protection to individuals whose
home countries failed to provide them with the protection they
needed.26 Indeed, the United States enacted the 1980 Refugee
Act to bring domestic law into compliance with international
refugee law and in so doing, enshrined the obligation of nonrefoulement, the duty not to return a refugee to a country where

24 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436–37 (1987); In re Negusie, 27 I. &
N. Dec. 347 (B.I.A. 2018) (drawing on international and comparative sources in interpreting
the duress defense); Brief for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 6, N-A-M- v. Mukasey, No. 08-9527 & 07-9580 (June 19,
2008) (“The Supreme Court has ruled that international law, including both treaty and
customary law, is ‘part of our [United States] law,’ and creates enforceable rights and
obligations for individuals in United States courts.” (alteration in original) (quoting The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900))); Fatma E. Marouf, The Role of Foreign
Authorities in U.S. Asylum Adjudication, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 391, 397–98 (2013).
25 The United States has signed and ratified both the 1967 U.N. Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees and the U.N. Convention Against Torture. See United
Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28,
1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137; United Nations Protocol relating to the Status
of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267
[together hereinafter Refugee Convention]; United Nations Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for
signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture]; see
also 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (signed and ratified by the United States) (setting forth
the obligation not to return individuals to torture where they would suffer irreparable
harm under Articles 6 and 7, protecting the right to life and the right to be free from
torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment).
26 DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES ch. 1 (West 2019).

326

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:2

her life or freedom would be threatened on the basis of certain
grounds, as defined under the Refugee Convention.27
Under Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention: “No
Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion.”28 As explained further below, this non-refoulement
obligation applies equally both to those already officially recognized
as refugees and to those who have not yet been recognized.29
The U.S. Supreme Court explained back in 1987 in INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca the critical importance of the Refugee Convention
to understanding U.S. law, emphasizing that “[i]f one thing is clear
from the legislative history of the new definition of ‘refugee,’ and
indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is that one of Congress’ primary
purposes was to bring United States refugee law into conformance
with the [Protocol], to which the United States acceded in 1968.”30
Accordingly, the Refugee Act of 1980 contains the following nonreturn provision: “[T]he Attorney General may not remove an alien
to a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or
freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien’s
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion.”31
Additionally, the United States has adopted specific
statutory and regulatory provisions incorporating Article 3 of
CAT, the duty not to return an individual to a country where the
person would likely face torture.32 Article 3 provides that:
27 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.); see H.R. Rep. 96-781, at 19–20 (1980) (Conf. Rep.) (stating that both
houses of Congress adopted the internationally-accepted definition of “refugee”).
28 Refugee Convention, supra note 25, at 176 (emphasis added). Although the
United States is a party to the Protocol, not the Convention, the Protocol incorporates
the operative parts of the Convention. AM. SOC’Y INT’L LAW, Human Rights, in
BENCHBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW § III.E-1, III.E-50 (Diane Marie Amann ed., 2014),
www.asil.org/benchbook/humanrights.pdf [https://perma.cc/NFX5-X989].
29 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Note on Non-Refoulement (Submitted by the
High Commissioner), U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/2 (Aug. 23, 1977) (“In evaluating the practice of
States in regard to the principle of non-refoulement, it, should be emphasized that the
principle applies irrespective of whether or not the person concerned has been formally
recognized as a refugee.”).
30 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436–37 (1987) (citations omitted).
31 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).
32 See Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105227, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681–822 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note); see also 8 C.F.R.
§§ 208.16–.18. The Convention Against Torture prohibits state parties, like the United
States, from returning an individual to a country “where there are substantial grounds
for believing that he would be in danger of being subject to torture.” Convention Against
Torture, supra note 25, at art. 3. Where an applicant can show that it is more likely than
not that she will be tortured if removed to another country, protection under CAT is
mandatory. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16–.17.
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1. No State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a
person to another State where there are substantial grounds for
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.
2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such
grounds, the competent authorities shall take into account all relevant
considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State
concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations
of human rights.33

When CAT was incorporated into U.S. law with the
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, the
implementing legislation emphasized that: “It shall be the policy
of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the
involuntary return of any person to a country” where the person
“would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” To do otherwise
would violate U.S. obligations under Article 3 of CAT.34
Supplementary information to the interim rule
establishing procedures for raising a claim for protection under
CAT explained that “[t]he primary goals of this rule are to
establish procedures that ensure that no alien is removed from
the United States under circumstances that would violate
Article 3 without unduly disrupting the issuance and execution
of removal orders consistent with Article 3.”35 It further noted
that “[t]o this end, we have designed a system that will allow
aliens subject to the various types of removal proceedings
currently afforded by the immigration laws to seek, and where
eligible, to be accorded protection under Article 3.”36
The interim rule sets forth screening procedures for
expedited removal as well as administrative removal and
reinstatement of removal37 and explains that “[f]or aliens subject
to removal proceedings under section 240 of the Act, . . . a claim
to protection under the Convention Against Torture will be
raised and considered, along with any other applications, during
removal proceedings before an immigration judge.”38
Although the supplementary information to the interim
rule does not expressly address the situation of individuals who
Convention Against Torture, supra note 25, at art. 3.
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, § 2242, 112 Stat.
2681, 822–23 (emphasis added).
35 Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8478,
8479 (Feb. 19, 1999). The legislation required that regulations implementing Article 3 be
set forth within 120 days, and the interim rule was implemented without the prior notice
and comment period ordinarily required due to this time constraint. Id. at 8478, 8486.
36 Id. at 8479.
37 See infra Part II for a discussion of expedited removal, administrative
removal, and reinstatement.
38 Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. at 8480.
33
34
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are apprehended on unexecuted removal orders, the goals set
forth in the supplementary information dictate the expansion of
the reasonable procedures to protect such individuals who have
legitimate fears of return but have never had the opportunity to
fully express those fears of return to an adjudicator.39
The expansion and amendment of the reasonable fear
process to allow individuals with prior unexecuted orders to
access a reasonable fear screening procedure would thus be an
important step in bringing the United States into compliance with
its domestic and international obligations not to return
individuals to persecution or torture.
B.

Non-Refoulement Obligations Under International Law

International law and guidance from the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) can
and should inform the United States’ understandings of its nonrefoulement obligations under the Refugee Convention and CAT,
which, as noted, the United States has incorporated into
domestic law.40 Indeed, the Supreme Court, federal courts, and
the Board of Immigration Appeals have repeatedly invoked the
relevance of international and comparative guidance and
jurisprudence in defining the scope of U.S. obligations under the
Refugee Convention and CAT.41
The Executive Committee of UNHCR, composed of
member states, has emphasized that non-refoulement is part of
customary international law and is not therefore subject to
derogation.42 Because of non-refoulement’s established and
39 The United States also has obligations to protect individuals from return to
torture, as well as to safeguard the rights to life and liberty of all those in its jurisdiction
under the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which the
United States signed in 1977 and ratified in 1992. See 1966 International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (signed
and ratified by the United States). In ratifying the ICCPR, the United States “declare[d]
that the provisions of Articles 1 through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing,” 138
CONG. REC. S4781-01 (daily ed., Apr. 2, 1992), but no implementing legislation has been
passed. AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L., supra note 28, at III.E-52.
40 See supra note 24.
41 See supra note 24.
42 See Alice Farmer, Non-Refoulement and Jus Cogens: Limiting Anti-Terror
Measures That Threaten Refugee Protection, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 2–3, 20, 26 (2008)
(noting that the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees signed by Latin American
countries also recognizes non-refoulement as a rule of jus cogens); see also U.N. High
Comm’r for Refugees & Lauterpacht Research Ctr. for Int’l Law, Summary Conclusions:
The Principle of Non-Refoulement ¶ 1 (July 2001), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/
globalconsult/3baf3117f/summary-conclusions-principle-non-refoulement.html [https://per
ma.cc/37Q5-BFB9]; U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, The Principle of Non-Refoulement as
a Norm of Customary International Law. Response to the Questions Posed to UNHCR by
the Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany in Cases 2 BvR
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recognized jus cogens status, any relevant policies cannot return
a person to face persecution or torture.43 This non-refoulement
obligation applies whether or not an individual has already
obtained protection or has already been recognized as a refugee
or asylee—meaning that an adjudicator has determined that the
individual meets the refugee definition—because the duty
against refoulement is absolute.44 As the UNHCR explained in
its Handbook on Procedures:
A person is a refugee within the meaning of the 1951 Convention
as soon as he fulfills the criteria contained in the [refugee] definition.
This would necessarily occur prior to the time at which his refugee
status is formally determined. Recognition of his refugee status does
not therefore make him a refugee but declares him to be one. He does
not become a refugee because of recognition, but is recognized because
he is a refugee.45

This guidance reflects an understanding of the barriers
to applying for refugee protection, including information gaps,
trauma, and inability to find legal representation.46
Furthermore, Article 32 of the Refugee Convention
prohibits state parties from expelling refugees except under highly
limited circumstances and requires that expulsion procedures
1938/93, 2 BvR 1953/93, 2 BvR 1954/93 ¶¶ 1, 17 (Jan. 31, 1994), http://www.refworld.
org/docid/437b6db64.html [https://perma.cc/A3GK-CWBW] [hereinafter The Principle of
Non-Refoulement] (noting that “[n]o consideration of public order should be allowed to
overrule that guarantee” that a refugee “must not be turned back to a country where his
life or freedom would be threatened”).
43 See Farmer, supra note 42, at 2, 20; see also U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees
& Lauterpacht Research Ctr. for Int’l Law, supra note 42, ¶ 7; The Principle of NonRefoulement, supra note 42, ¶ 2.
44 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial
Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations Under the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol ¶¶ 6–7, 12 (Jan. 26, 2007), http://www.
refworld.org/docid/45f17a1a4.html [https://perma.cc/264N-6B3X] [hereinafter UNHCR
Advisory Opinion] (noting that “the principle of non-refoulement constitutes an essential
and non-derogable component of international refugee protection”); Note on NonRefoulement (Submitted by the High Commissioner), supra note 29, ¶ 15.
45 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (Jan. 1992, reissued 2019);
see also Exec. Comm. of the High Comm’r’s Programme, Non-Refoulement No. 6 (XXVIII),
U.N. Doc. 12A (A/32/12/Add. 1) (Oct. 12, 1977) (emphasizing “the fundamental importance
of the principle of non-refoulement . . . of persons who may be subjected to persecution if
returned to their country of origin irrespective of whether or not they have been formally
recognized as refugees”). Under Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
all individuals have the right “to seek asylum from persecution, and the fundamental
principle of non-refoulement requires that States not return refugees to territories where
their lives or freedom may be endangered.” Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Article 31 of the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: Non-penalization, Detention, and Protection,
in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR’S GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 185, 231 (Erika Feller et al. eds., 2001).
46 See Preston, supra note 2.
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comport with due process principles.47 Specifically Article 32
mandates that “[t]he Contracting States shall not expel a refugee
lawfully in their territory save on grounds of national security or
public order” and emphasizes that “[t]he expulsion of such a
refugee shall be only in pursuance of a decision reached in
accordance with due process of law.”48 Scholars have argued that
the term “lawful” in Article 32 should be interpreted broadly to
encompass individuals who the state has previously decided not to
expel given the state’s acquiescence to the presence of the
individual.49 Under Article 32, individuals whose claims for
protection were never processed, or were not timely or fairly
processed, should therefore be afforded greater protections and
rights, including against expulsion.50
The UNHCR Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial
Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951
Convention emphasizes that “[the duty is on the state to
establish], prior to implementing any removal measure, that the
person whom it intends to remove from their territory or their
jurisdiction would not be exposed to a danger of serious human
rights violations[.]”51 States that ratify the Refugee Convention
and the 1967 Protocol must “necessarily undertake to implement
those instruments in good faith,” with attention to “situations
where the system of administration may produce results
incompatible with the applicable principle or standard of
international law.”52
The UNHCR has underscored the need to provide “[a]ll
applicants for international protection . . . the same procedural
safeguards and rights”—including the provision of a personal
interview—to ensure that their fears of return are fully heard and
adjudicated.53 When, after a decision has been made, an applicant
cites new or previously unheard facts or evidence related to their
claim for protection, an applicant for protection cannot be
47 Refugee Convention, supra note 25, at art. 32 (expulsion); see JAMES C.
HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 154–92 (2005).
48 Refugee Convention, supra note 25, at art. 32 (expulsion); see HATHAWAY,
supra note 47, at 669–72.
49 HATHAWAY, supra note 47, at 173–86, 659–66.
50 See id. at 667.
51 UNHCR Advisory Opinion, supra note 44, ¶ 22 (emphasis added); see Sir
Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the Principle of NonRefoulement, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR’S GLOBAL
CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 45, ¶¶ 20, 44, 73–76
(noting that a denial of protection in the absence of a review of individual circumstances
is inconsistent with the prohibition of refoulement).
52 Goodwin-Gill, supra note 45, at 216, 218.
53 U.N.
High Comm’r for Refugees, Improving Asylum Procedures:
Comparative Analysis and Recommendations for Law and Practice, at 242 (Mar. 2010),
https://www.unhcr.org/4c7b71039.pdf [https://perma.cc/7K2F-RWB9].
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“removed to his/her country of origin until and unless it is
established, following rigorous scrutiny of the new elements or
findings together with the previous application, that there is no
real risk of persecution or serious harm to the applicant if
returned.”54 Yet the U.S. system includes no systematic
mechanism for such rigorous scrutiny, leaving bona fide refugees
in real danger of forced return to persecution or torture.
II.

FAILURES OF PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS FROM
REMOVAL AND VIOLATIONS OF U.S. NON-REFOULEMENT
OBLIGATIONS

The procedural protections against refoulement
implemented in the U.S. system fall short in many ways.
In most cases the only recourse available to an individual
with a prior unexecuted removal order is filing a motion to reopen.
Yet, seasoned attorneys and immigrants alike face hurdles in
satisfying the stringent legal requirements for motions to
reopen.55 Indeed, as one scholar emphasized, “the circumstances
that allow reopening are so specific and rare that they are
virtually impossible to attain.”56 Considered in light of the nonrefoulement obligation, the current motion to reopen process does
not adequately safeguard the rights of individuals who face
deportation based on prior unexecuted removal orders to
countries where they will be persecuted or tortured. Neither does
the current reasonable fear process, which in practice, only
provides a limited and flawed screening to those who were
previously deported and attempt to reenter the United States.
A.

The Motion to Reopen Process and its Shortcomings

Courts have repeatedly proclaimed that “[m]otions to
reopen . . . are generally disfavored” in an effort to protect the
finality of proceedings and deter unnecessary delays of removal

Id. at 392.
See, e.g., Kristin Macleod-Ball, Supreme Court to Decide Whether It’s Okay
to Deprive a Person of His Day in Immigration Court, IMMIGR. IMPACT (Apr. 30, 2015),
http://immigrationimpact.com/2015/04/30/supreme-court-to-decide-whether-its-okay-todeprive-a-person-of-his-day-in-immigration-court/ [https://perma.cc/D3SM-B65B]; see
also Robert L. Koehl, Perpetual Finality: In Immigration Removal Proceedings, Motions
to Reopen Create More Problems Than They Solve, TEX. A&M L. REV., Fall 2014, at 107,
121 (“Some bases [for motions to reopen] have been subject to inconsistent application
and definition, leading to confusion among immigration lawyers and courts alike as to
their requirements.”).
56 Koehl, supra note 55, at 121.
54
55
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without cause.57 Yet, the need for finality must be balanced
against the need for justice and the need to protect individuals
from refoulement—which the very limited motion to reopen
procedures generally fail to do.58
First, most motions to reopen are subject to strict
numerical limitations and deadlines.59 Except in limited
circumstances, individuals can only file a single motion to reopen
or reconsider immigration proceedings.60 The time frame for filing
is similarly restrictive, as motions to reconsider must be filed
within thirty days from when a final administrative order of
removal is entered, and motions to reopen must be filed within
ninety days of a final order. Such severe limitations and
restrictions make it exceedingly difficult for people to have access
to this procedural avenue.61
Second, although motions to reopen in order to apply for
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under CAT
based on changed country conditions are exempt from these time
and numeric restrictions,62 even when exempted from time and
numeric restrictions, such motions are nonetheless often
difficult to win.63 The evidence of changed conditions presented
must be “material” and “not available” or discoverable at a
previous proceeding.64 Individuals must also show prima facie
eligibility for the relief sought.65 Additionally, it is important to

57 Balyan v. Holder, 575 F. App’x 763, 767 (9th Cir. 2014); see Polyakov v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 297 F. App’x 844, 845 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Motions to reopen are disfavored . . . .”); see also
EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REV., IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL, at ch. 5.7,
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1084851/download [https://perma.cc/V8JN-HDJ7]
(describing the narrow circumstances under which motions to reopen may be granted).
58 See Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Remedies for the Wrongly Deported: Territoriality,
Finality, and the Significance of Departure, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. 139, 178–79 (2010) (noting
the tension between finality concerns and the “important safeguard” against deportation
that motions to reopen can provide (citations omitted)).
59 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1).
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 This too is arguably a violation of international law and due process but is
outside the scope of this article.
63 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1); INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii) (codified as 8.U.S.C.
§ 1229a (c)(7)(c)(ii)); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(i).
64 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(i); see also INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 324 (1992).
65 INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 141 (1981) (per curiam); Lopez-Vasquez v.
Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2013); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3) (“Any motion to
reopen for the purpose of acting on an application for relief must be accompanied by the
appropriate application for relief and all supporting documents.”).
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note that the filing of a motion to reopen does not generally stay
removal,66 except in certain limited circumstances.67
Third, while courts may rescind in absentia orders and
reopen cases, if individuals can establish that the court should
excuse their failure to appear due to “exceptional circumstances”
that are beyond the individual’s control, courts have interpreted
the avenues to rescinding in absentia orders narrowly.68 Courts
have found, for example, a car’s mechanical failure alone
insufficient to meet the exceptional circumstance exception and
have entered in absentia orders of removal against individuals
who arrive late or fail to find the courtroom even if they are in
the courthouse.69 Exceptional circumstances may include serious
health conditions, “battery or extreme cruelty,” or ineffective
assistance of counsel.70 Motions may also be based on lack of
notice of the hearing or the fact that the individual was in federal
or state custody at the time of the hearing.71
The limitations of these procedural protections are
particularly glaring in the in absentia context given that
individuals ordered removed in absentia are not afforded an
opportunity to be heard by an immigration judge.72 Professor
Jennifer Lee Koh aptly terms these proceedings, “Removal at the
Peripheries of Immigration Court,” given that in absentia
removal orders “involve token adjudication by [immigration
judges]”—although “the orders are signed by [immigration
judges] and take place under the auspices of the immigration
courts, . . . [they] involve no actual merits-based assessment.”73
As Koh notes, such proceedings are “part of [the] immigration
66 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(f), 1003.23(b)(4)(i); see also BETH WERLIN, AM. IMMIGRATION
COUNCIL, PRACTICE ADVISORY: RESCINDING AN IN ABSENTIA ORDER OF REMOVAL 2 (Mar. 2010),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/practice_advisory/lac_pa_09210
4.pdf [https://perma.cc/FZK9-ZAK2]; Maria Baldini-Potermin, It’s Time to Consider Automatic
Stays of Removal: Petitions for Review, Motions to Reopen, BIA Regulations, and the Race to the
Courthouse, 10-01 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (2010).
67 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(f); INA § 240(b)(5)(C) (codified as 8 U.S.C. 1229a(b)(5)(C));
8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii).
68 Koh, Removal in the Shadows, supra note 1, at 219.
69 Id. at 219–20 (citing Perez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 770, 772–73 (9th Cir. 2008);
Thomas v. INS, 976 F.2d 786, 788, 790 (1st Cir. 1992) (per curiam); In re Chaman Singh,
No. A72-567-465, 2004 WL 3187212, at *1–2 (B.I.A. Dec. 20, 2004); Arredondo v. Lynch,
824 F.3d 801, 806 (9th Cir. 2016)).
70 INA § 240(e)(1) (codified as 8 USC 1229a(e)(1)); see WERLIN, supra note 66,
at 8, 10–11.
71 INA § 240(b)(5)(C)(ii) (codified as 8 U.S.C. 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii)). The Immigration
Judges and the Board may also sua sponte reopen cases as a last resort; there is however
limited judicial review of such motions. Vikram K. Badrinath et al., Time-Barred Motions
to Reopen—Tips and Tricks for Success, AILA IMMIGR. PRAC. POINTERS 801 (2015),
https://www.aila.org/File/Related/14072246b.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MGD-T4Z4].
72 See Wadhia, supra note 1, at 7 (noting the minimal procedural safeguards
in the stipulated removal and in absentia removal context).
73 Koh, Removal in the Shadows, supra note 1, at 214–15.
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court’s shadows.”74 Under U.S. law, if an individual misses even
one court hearing, regardless of whether the individual appeared
at prior hearings, the court “shall” order her removal as long as
the government provides evidence that notice was given and the
individual is removable.75 In absentia removals, which accounted
for about 40% of court-ordered removals in non-detained cases in
fiscal year 2016,76 as well as other unexecuted prior removal
orders, thus require a failsafe mechanism—a reasonable fear
screening prior to removal—to ensure that individuals are not
removed without having their fears of return heard.
For example, consider the barriers facing Manuel, the
indigenous Guatemalan man apprehended by ICE based on a
decade-old in absentia removal order.77 Manuel did not meet any
of the exceptional circumstances necessary to rescind his order
and his only option was therefore to try to reopen his prior order
based on changed circumstances to then apply for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under CAT. Manuel had
fled to the United States from Guatemala in the 1990s due to
ongoing violence and discrimination against his family because
of his race and his union organizing efforts. He was caught
crossing the border and ordered to appear in immigration court,
but he was unrepresented and too scared to go by himself, so he
missed his court date and was ordered removed in absentia,
without ever having his fear of return to Guatemala adjudicated.
74 Id.
at 215; see also Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-828, 110 Stat. 3008 (establishing different
forms of non-judicial removal including expedited removal, administrative voluntary
departure, reinstatement, administrative removal, and stipulated orders of removal).
For further information on the various summary deportation procedures, see ACLU,
AMERICAN EXILE: RAPID DEPORTATIONS THAT BYPASS THE COURTROOM 10–12 (2014),
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/120214-expeditedremoval_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7E
U-DBY4] [hereinafter ACLU, AMERICAN EXILE]; 8 C.F.R. § 235.3 (describing expedited
removal proceedings). Although reasonable fear screenings should occur within ten days
under current regulations, see 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(b), the process in practice is often much
slower. See Complaint at 2, Garcia v. Johnson, 14-cv-01775 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2014),
http://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/RFI%20brief%20FIN
AL%20filed.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9FB-XU64]. Individuals subject to reinstatement of
removal are generally detained for the duration of the reasonable fear screening, and
subsequent immigration court hearing process (if they pass the initial screening). See
Gilman, supra note 22, at 308–13.
75 Koh, Removal in the Shadows, supra note 1, at 218 (citing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(b)(5)(A)). There is a presumption that any properly addressed, stamped, and
mailed hearing notice was received by the addressee. See In Re M-R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec.
665, 671 (B.I.A. 2008).
76 EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2016:
STATISTICS YEARBOOK, at P4 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/fysb16/down
load [https://perma.cc/3SL3-ETQ4].
77 “Of the immigration judge decisions rendered in Fiscal Year (FY) 2016,
[twenty-five] percent involved in absentia orders. The In Absentia rate dramatically
increased from FY 2012 ([eleven] percent) to FY 2015 ([twenty-eight] percent) but has
shown a slight decline from FY 2015 to FY 2016 ([twenty-five] percent).” Id. at P1.
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Manuel did not know about this in absentia order and never left
the country. A decade later, he was picked up by ICE during a
workplace raid and held in detention, pending removal.
Manuel was lucky that he could afford an attorney who could
file a motion to reopen on his behalf based on changed country
conditions, namely the resurgence of persecution of indigenous
people in Guatemala. However, many who are apprehended on prior
removal orders have no access to counsel and are deported without
having their fears of return assessed. Although there is a right to
counsel in immigration proceedings, the U.S. government does not
supply representation, and immigrants facing removal must either
find the funds to pay an attorney or find pro bono representation
through a nonprofit, law school clinic, or law firm.78 Indeed, a recent
national study found that fewer than 40% of immigrants facing
removal were represented by an attorney in cases decided on the
merits,79 and approximately 86% of immigrants in detention
facilities went unrepresented.80
Given that motions to reopen require submission of a
written argument along with supporting documentation,81 it is
very difficult, if not impossible, for unrepresented individuals to

78 See INA § 240(b)(4)(A) (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)) (“[T]he alien shall have
the privilege of being represented, at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien’s
choosing who is authorized to practice in such proceedings . . . .”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.16(b).
Immigration proceedings are considered civil proceedings, and asylum seekers who face
removal from the United States do not have the same constitutional protections as defendants
in criminal proceedings. Scholars have, however, repeatedly argued that due process requires
the provision of counsel to indigent immigrants who cannot afford representation. See, e.g.,
Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299 (2011); John R. Mills
et al., “Death Is Different” and a Refugee’s Right to Counsel, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 361 (2009);
Beth J. Werlin, Renewing the Call: Immigrants’ Right to Appointed Counsel in Deportation
Cases, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 393 (2000).
79 Although the study does not specifically address motions to reopen, the
results are nonetheless informative in considering the motion to reopen context. See
Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration
Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 57 (2016) (“[R]emoval respondents were significantly more
likely to obtain successful outcomes when represented by counsel. Specifically, after
controlling for all of the factors just described (detention status, region of nationality,
charge, year, and base city), the odds were fifteen times greater that immigrants with
representation, as compared to those without, sought relief, five-and-a-half times greater
that they obtained relief from removal, and almost two times greater that they had their
case terminated”); id. at 7 (“By looking at individual removal cases decided on the merits,
we find that only 37% of immigrants had counsel during our study period . . . .”).
80 Id. at 8; see also ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON
IMMIGRATION, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE
INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICATION OF
REMOVAL CASES, at ES-7, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/
media/nosearch/immigration_reform_executive_summary_012510.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U3N7-9QQ9].
81 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also Patel v. INS, 741
F.2d 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[I]n the context of a motion to reopen, the BIA is not
required to consider allegations unsupported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.”).
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file the papers necessary to succeed in reopening their claims.82
Moreover, although “[j]udicial review of a motion to reopen
serves as a ‘safety valve’ in the asylum process,”83 appealing to
circuit courts of appeal may be out of reach for some pro se
applicants, and individuals may face deportation before their
appeals are heard.84
Execution of a prior removal order in a case like that of
Manuel thus violates U.S. obligations against non-refoulement
under both domestic and international law. To the extent that
such prior removal orders are executed, at a minimum individuals
must be afforded due process and equal protection. Specifically,
the reasonable fear screening process, described further below,
should be expanded and implemented pre-removal for all those
with prior, unexecuted removal orders, given how similarly
situated they are to those who have been deported and reenter.
B.

Reinstatement of Removal, the Reasonable Fear Process,
and its Shortcomings

Although an extensive discussion of non-judicial removal
is outside the scope of this article, a brief overview is necessary to
contextualize the reasonable fear process.85 In short, prior to the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (IIRIRA), noncitizens in the United States were generally
accorded full hearings before an immigration judge who
determined, for example, whether they feared return to their
home countries and should be allowed to remain in the United
States and afforded protection under the Refugee Convention and
CAT.86 Following IIRIRA, however, Congress created and
82 See, e.g., James F. Smith, United States Immigration Law as We Know It: El
Clandestino, The American Gulag, Rounding Up the Usual Suspects, 38 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 747, 754 n.16 (2005) (“To seek to reopen the matter now, [the noncitizen defendant]
or his attorney would have to overcome very difficult legal hurdles such as filing a motion
to reopen the order of removal on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. But, even
if well-presented, it is highly likely that the BIA would deny the motion on the grounds
that it was not filed within [ninety] days of the order of removal. While the Ninth Circuit
might reverse through the doctrine of equitable tolling, such litigation is far too complex
and expensive for most noncitizen defendants.” (citations omitted)).
83 Salim v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that “[s]uch
oversight ‘ensure[s] that the BIA lives by its rules and at least considers new information’
bearing on applicants’ need for and right to relief” (quoting Pilia v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d
941, 948 (6th Cir. 2004))).
84 See Baldini-Potermin, supra note 66.
85 For an in-depth discussion, see, e.g., Jennifer Lee Koh, Waiving Due Process
(Goodbye): Stipulated Orders of Removal and the Crisis in Immigration Adjudication, 91
N.C. L. REV. 475 (2013) [hereinafter Koh, Waiving Due Process]; Family, supra note 1;
Wadhia, supra note 1.
86 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, § 10, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat.
911, 917–18; see also ACLU, AMERICAN EXILE, supra note 74, at 3.
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expanded a series of mechanisms to allow for summary
deportations of certain individuals without full hearings in front
of an immigration judge.87 The summary removal procedures
permit immigration officers to issue removal or deportation
orders, bypassing the courtroom hearing process.88
These summary removal procedures include: expedited
removal, stipulated orders of removal, administrative removal, and
reinstatement of removal, which is the focus of this article. In
recent years, the majority of those deported from the United States
have been sent back to their home countries through these
summary procedures—most through expedited removal or
reinstatement of removal.89 Expedited removal allows the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to order removal of
certain noncitizens who do not have valid entry documents, with
bars on readmission to the United States of five years or more.90
Reinstatement of removal allows DHS to order removal of
noncitizens who were previously deported and reentered without
permission.91 DHS “reinstates” or, in other words reactivates, the
prior removal order, making these individuals “forever deportable”
with no statute of limitations.92 These prior orders may themselves
have been issued in absentia, without a hearing on the merits, or
in summary proceedings by a DHS official rather than by an

87 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
§§ 302, 304(d), 305(a)(5), 379(a), Pub. L. No. 104-828, 110 Stat. 3008; ACLU, AMERICAN
EXILE, supra note 74, at 3.
88 ACLU, AMERICAN EXILE, supra note 74, at 3.
89 BRYAN BAKER, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS: 2016, at 9 (Dec. 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Enf
orcement_Actions_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZAM6-MJZ6] (noting that “nearly [eightyfive] percent were expedited removals or reinstatement of prior removal orders”); see also
ACLU, AMERICAN EXILE, supra note 74, at 3.
90 INA § 235(b)(1). Prior to July 2019, expedited removal was only applied to
those who were found without proper documentation in the United States within one
hundred miles of the border, within fourteen days of entering the country. DHS changed
its policy in July 2019, announcing an expansion of expedited removal to encompass any
individual found within any part of the United States without valid documentation,
within two years of their entry into the country. This expansion was, however, stayed
through litigation in federal district court. See HILLEL R. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R45314, EXPEDITED REMOVAL OF ALIENS: LEGAL FRAMEWORK 1–2 (2019), https://fas.org/
sgp/crs/homesec/R45314.pdf [https://perma.cc/PJ6B-EM2F].
91 See BAKER, supra note 89, at 8–9; see also Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 305(a)(5).
92 Koh, When Shadow Removals Collide, supra note 1, at 357; Koh, Removal
in the Shadows, supra note 1, at 202–06; see Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 § 305(a)(5).
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immigration judge.93 Reinstatement of removal thus allows for
immediate deportation without a hearing in immigration court.94
In an effort to safeguard noncitizens against return to
persecution or torture, the U.S. government created a “safety
valve” or “safety hatch”95 in some of these summary proceedings,
aptly termed “shadow removals” by Jennifer Lee Koh.96 For each
type of non-judicial removal, the law provides specific procedural
protections to screen individuals for fears of return to their home
countries. The credible fear process is, for example, the safety
valve in expedited removal,97 and the reasonable fear process is
the safety valve for individuals in reinstatement proceedings and
certain types of administrative removal.98 Congress established
93 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.8(a)–(b), 1241.8(b). Judges and scholars alike have decried
the due process concerns raised by reinstatement proceedings. See, e.g., Koh, Removal in
the Shadows, supra note 1, at 202–06; Koh, When Shadow Removals Collide, supra note
1, at 358; see also Garcia v. Sessions, 856 F.3d 27, 43 (1st Cir. 2017) (Stahl, J., dissenting)
(noting that the majority “ignor[es] the fact that [the noncitizen] was denied due process
in his initial removal proceedings”).
94 INA § 241(a)(5) (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5)). Reinstatement only requires
that an immigration officer determine (1) the identity of the person in question; (2)
whether the person was subject to a prior order of removal, exclusion, or deportation;
and (3) whether the person unlawfully reentered the United States. 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.8(a),
1241.8(a). The immigration officer must provide the person with written notice of the
reinstatement and allow the person to make a statement contesting the decision. 8 C.F.R.
§§ 241.8(b), 1241.8(b). Reinstatement proceedings, unlike expedited removal, may be
initiated anywhere in the country. ACLU, AMERICAN EXILE, supra note 74, at 19 n.94
(citing a study documenting 8,300 ICE reinstatements in the Chicago area between FY
2007 and FY 2011). DHS can also return people to their home countries under stipulated
orders of removal and administrative removal applied throughout the country to bypass
the immigration court hearing system. For further discussion of stipulated removals, see
Koh, Waiving Due Process, supra note 85.
95 Family, supra note 1, at 643.
96 Koh, When Shadow Removals Collide, supra note 1, at 337. Yet, even with these
safety valves, summary deportation processes are nonetheless improperly punitive and deny
due process to individuals with legitimate claims to protection in the United States. For
example, the 2015 Office of the Inspector General report on the Streamline Initiative found
that individuals expressing a fear of return to persecution or torture are nonetheless
prosecuted, in many cases before the asylum seeker is able to apply for or receive asylum, in
violation of U.S. obligations under the Refugee Convention and CAT. OIG REPORT, supra note
22, at 16–17 (recommending that Border Patrol “develop, and implement processing and
referral guidance for aliens who express a fear of persecution or return to their country of
origin at any time during their Border Patrol processing for Streamline” and noting that CBP
issued “a guidance memorandum and muster modules to the field to emphasize and further
address credible fear determinations in expedited removal cases”).
97 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
§ 302(a). The credible fear process requires border officials placing immigrants in expedited
removal to screen for fears of return to persecution or torture and then refer those
individuals to USCIS for a credible fear interview with a trained asylum officer. If the
immigrant receives a negative credible fear determination, he or she may appeal to an
immigration judge for a reinterview. ACLU, AMERICAN EXILE, supra note 74, at 33–43.
98 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(c); ACLU, AMERICAN EXILE, supra note 74, at 2 (“For
many individuals facing reinstatement of a prior order, the only relief they can apply
for—assuming they are made aware of it—is mandatory protection for individuals who
can demonstrate a reasonable fear of torture or persecution in their country of origin.
Again, DHS has the option of using its discretion to terminate the reinstatement process
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these safety valves to safeguard individuals, at least in theory,
from return to countries where they fear persecution or torture.99
Many who undergo the reasonable fear process are
individuals with prior removal orders who have returned to the
United States for a variety of reasons, including fleeing serious
human rights violations in their home countries.100 Although, as
compared to the number of individuals seeking asylum in the
United States each year—over 330,000 first time applicants in
2017—101 the number of people who go through the reasonable fear
screening process is small, it is nevertheless on the rise. In Fiscal
Year 2017, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS)
“clocked in” 10,273 reasonable fear cases102—over ten times as
many as in Fiscal Year 2008, when 741 were “clocked in.”103 USCIS

(and either cancel the reinstatement order, refer the person to a full immigration court
hearing, or defer the deportation).”).
99 See U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs, Reasonable Fear Screenings:
Overview (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/
reasonable-fear-screenings [https://perma.cc/JPQ6-UBWK]; see also Am. Immigration
Council, Removal Without Recourse: The Growth of Summary Deportations from the
United States (Apr. 28, 2014), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/
removal-without-recourse-growth-summary-deportations-united-states [https://perma.
cc/J3XV-RC3L]; Family, supra note 1, at 643.
100 See Complaint at 1–2, Garcia v. Johnson, 14-cv-01775 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17,
2014), http://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/RFI%20brief%2
0FINAL%20filed.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VPX-FSZU]; see also ACLU, AMERICAN EXILE,
supra note 74, at 3, 19 (noting that “‘reinstatement of removal,’ issued to individuals
previously deported who reenter without permission, accounts for the largest single
number of deportations ([thirty-nine] percent)” with 159,634 people deported through
Reinstatement in FY 2013).
101 U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED DISPLACEMENT
IN 2017, at 40 (2017), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/statistics/unhcrstats/5b27be547/unh
cr-global-trends-2017.html [https://perma.cc/ZRW5-H2CK] (“This represents a [twentyseven] percent increase from 2016 (262,000) and nearly double the number in 2015
(172,700), and is consistent with a steadily increasing number of asylum claims in the
United States of America since 2013.”).
102 ASYLUM OFFICE DIV., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS, FY2017
REASONABLE FEAR WORKLOAD SUMMARY (2017), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/file
s/USCIS/Outreach/Upcoming%20National%20Engagements/PED_FY17_CFandRFstats
Thru09302017.pdf [https://perma.cc/29R7-G38C].
103 ASYLUM OFFICE DIV., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., REP.
APCLS344, ASYLUM PRE-SCREENING SYSTEM (Dec. 11, 2014), [hereinafter APSS] (on file
with author). The numbers are still low as compared to those who go through the credible
fear screening process. For example, from July 2014 to March 2015, USCIS conducted a
total of 118 reasonable fear interviews at family detention centers in the United States
and reached a decision in 109 cases, with a finding of a reasonable fear of return in 78.9%
of cases. By contrast, during that same period, USCIS conducted and decided over 3,400
credible fear interviews at family detention centers, with a finding of a credible fear in
75.3% of cases. See ASYLUM OFFICE DIV., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS,
FAMILY FACILITIES REASONABLE FEAR/CREDIBLE FEAR (Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.uscis.
gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/PED-CF-RF-familiy-facilities-FY2015Q2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y7A8-NJHN].
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found a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in approximately
3,000 cases in FY 2017.104
Yet, the current fear screening procedures are both
unnecessarily narrow and seriously flawed. Reasonable fear
interviews, for example, are limited to two types of cases:
individuals subject to reinstatement of a prior removal order
when found to have “reentered the United States illegally after
having been removed or having departed voluntarily, under an
order of removal, [deportation, or exclusion]”105 and individuals
who are not lawful permanent residents and are convicted of
certain aggravated felonies in the United States, who are subject
to administrative removal.106
Moreover, both the credible fear and reasonable fear
screening processes are rife with errors, including failures to
properly screen for, or listen to, fears of return and pressure to
abandon claims for protection.107 In the reasonable fear
104 ASYLUM OFFICE DIV., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS, FY2017
REASONABLE FEAR WORKLOAD SUMMARY (2017), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/
USCIS/Outreach/Upcoming%20National%20Engagements/PED_FY17_CFandRFstatsTh
ru09302017.pdf [https://perma.cc/922T-PJB8]. An analysis of data received in a Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) request regarding reasonable fear determinations from January
1, 2013 to December 2014 revealed that out of 9,811 cases decided, women were found to
have a reasonable fear of persecution more often than men: 65% of the time, as compared
to 51%. FOIA request and results on file with author. The results were analyzed using
Stata. During this period, 2,900 reasonable fear of persecution claims involved membership
in a particular social group—the most-represented reason for filing a claim—and
approximately 78% of these individuals were found to have a reasonable fear. Id.
105 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). In this article, I focus on this first category—individuals
with prior removal orders caught attempting to reenter the United States, given the
similarity of their circumstances to those with unexecuted, outstanding removal orders
apprehended within the United States. For comprehensive description of the reinstatement
of removal process and requirements for reinstatement of removal, see TRINA REALMUTO,
NAT’L IMMIGRATION PROJECT, PRACTICE ADVISORY: REINSTATEMENT OF REMOVAL 4 (2013),
https://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/PDFs/practitioners/practice_advisories/gen/
2013_29Apr_reinstate-removal.pdf [https://perma.cc/848N-JEN8] (noting that “[t]he plain
language of § 241(a)(5) requires an illegal reentry ‘after having been removed or having
departed voluntarily, under an order of removal.’ If the client has not departed the country
since the removal order, the statute does not apply. However, in this situation, DHS could
attempt to execute the outstanding order” (emphasis omitted)).
106 See 8 U.S.C. § 1228; 8 C.F.R. § 208.31.
107 Numerous reports have cited flaws in the system, with CBP officers actively
discouraging applicants from expressing fears of return and failing to heed the fears
articulated. See, e.g., Letter from Keren Zwick et al., Nat’l Immigrant Justice Ctr., to Megan
H. Mack, Officer of Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., and John Roth,
Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Homeland Sec., on Inadequate U.S. Customs and Border Protection
screening practices block individuals fleeing persecution from access to the asylum process
10–12 (Nov. 13, 2014), http://immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/images/
Right%20to%20Asylum%20-%20CRCL%20Complaint%20Cover%20Letter%20-%2011.13.
14%20FINAL%20PUBLIC.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5DS-4XP6] (detailing intimidation
tactics by CBP officers and failures to properly acknowledge fears of return); see also “You
Don’t Have Rights Here,” HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.hrw.org/es/node/
129878/section/6 [https://perma.cc/53E6-WMZ4] (noting that “[b]etween October 2010 and
September 2012, the vast majority of Hondurans, 81 percent, were placed in the fast-track
expedited removal and reinstatement of removal proceedings; [but] only a miniscule
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interview, an asylum officer must assess whether an individual
has “a reasonable fear of persecution or torture.”108 Under the
regulations, asylum officers must conduct reasonable fear
interviews in “a non-adversarial manner, separate and apart
from the general public” and must make sure that the individual
being interviewed “has an understanding of the reasonable fear
determination process.”109 The asylum officer must “create a
summary of the material facts as stated by the applicant,” which
the officer must review with the individual at the end of the
interview to provide the individual “with an opportunity to
correct errors therein.”110
If an asylum officer determines that an individual has a
reasonable fear, then the individual is placed in “withholding
only” proceedings and allowed the opportunity to have his or her
claim for withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) or for protection under
CAT adjudicated in immigration court.111 If an asylum officer
minority, 1.9 percent, were flagged for credible fear assessments by CBP”). Under the
regulations, absent “exceptional circumstances,” this screening interview must take place
within ten days. 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(b). Yet, in practice, many wait weeks or even months
and sometimes more than a year, before such a screening takes place and even longer
before a decision is reached. Complaint at 2, 7–8, Garcia v. Johnson, 14-cv-01775 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/RFI%20
brief%20FINAL%20filed.pdf [https://perma.cc/W65H-82ST].
108 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(c).
109 Id.
110 Id. USCIS recently changed its practice with respect to note-taking in the
reasonable fear process. Previously, immigrants had to review and sign a sworn
statement, which the asylum officer read back to them, and allowed them to correct.
Now, asylum officers take interview notes in a question and answer format. In keeping
with the regulations, the asylum officer must give the immigrant “a summary of the
claim to . . . provide an opportunity [for the immigrant] to correct errors,” as well as an
opportunity to “explain any inconsistencies” and “provide more detail concerning
material issues.” Memorandum from John Lafferty Chief, Asylum Div., to Asylum Div.
Dir’s et al., on Updated Guidance on Reasonable Fear Note-Taking (May 9, 2014),
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Notes%20from%20Previous%2
0Engagements/2014/MEMO_Updated_Guidance_on_Reasonable_Fear_Note_Taking.pd
f [https://perma.cc/B8V5-NSDR] [hereinafter Lafferty Memo].
111 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.31(e), 1208.31(e). Although advocates have repeatedly
challenged the limitations inherent in withholding only proceedings, arguing that
individuals eligible for asylum should be able to apply for asylum protection as well,
multiple circuits have upheld the prohibitions on applying for asylum in withholding
only proceedings. See, e.g., Garcia v. Sessions, 856 F.3d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 2017) (declining
to overturn the Attorney General’s interpretation of the regulations); R-S-C v. Sessions,
869 F.3d 1176, 1117 (10th Cir. 2017) (same); Cazun v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 856 F.3d 249, 251
(3d Cir. 2017) (same); Perez-Guzman v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016)
(same); see also Garcia v. Sessions, 873 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 2017) (pointing to the
plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5)); Mejia v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 573 (4th Cir. 2017)
(same); Jimenez-Morales v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 821 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2016) (same);
Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 485 (5th Cir. 2015) (same); Herrera-Molina v. Holder,
597 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2010) (same). A discussion of the arguments in support of and
against eligibility for applying for asylum in the context of withholding only proceedings
is outside the scope of this article.
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does not find a reasonable fear of persecution or torture, the
individual either is ordered removed or can apply for review of
the decision by an immigration judge.112 The immigration judge
can then reverse the negative reasonable fear determination and
allow the case to go forward for a full hearing in immigration
court.113 The immigration judge can also affirm the negative
decision, in which case the applicant can submit a request for reinterview with the Asylum Office, or face removal.114
In order to adequately safeguard all noncitizens against
return to persecution or torture, robust fear screening mechanisms
need to be applied both to noncitizens who were deported and
attempt to reenter and to noncitizens with prior removal orders
who were never deported. As set forth in Parts III and IV infra, due
process and equal protection considerations, as well as U.S.
obligations under international law, dictate expansion and
amelioration of the reasonable fear process to adequately
safeguard the rights of all those who fear removal to a country
where they would face persecution or torture.115
III.

WHAT CONSTITUTES A MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY TO BE
HEARD? DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
CONSIDERATIONS

The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that “the
Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in

112 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(f); 1208.31(g); see also U.S. Citizenship & Immigration
Servs, Questions & Answers: Reasonable Fear Screenings (June 8, 2013), https://www.
uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-and-asylum/asylum/questions-and-answers-reason
able-fear-screenings [https://perma.cc/TWX8-TPB5]. For a full discussion of the ways in
which withholding only grantees are disadvantaged as compared to asylum seekers, see
Harris, supra note 18.
113 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(g)(2), 1208.31(g)(2). USCIS adopted new quality assurance
measures in 2014 in an effort to promote consistent decision-making in credible and reasonable
fear cases. Prior to 2014, USCIS headquarters reviewed cases with a negative reasonable fear
determination; as a result of this new quality assurance measure, headquarters reviews a
random sampling of all cases—positive and negative determinations—to promote uniform and
unbiased adjudication. See Lafferty Memo, supra note 110.
114 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.31(g)(1), 1208.31(g)(1); see also Memorandum from Office
of Chief Immigration Judge to All Immigration Judges et al., on Implementation of
Article 3 of the UN Convention Against Torture 8 (May 14, 1999) (noting the negative
RFI review process in immigration court allows for attorney representation, but the role
of counsel is limited and at the judge’s discretion).
115 See, e.g., Won Kidane, Procedural Due Process in the Expulsion of Aliens
Under International, United States, and European Union Law: A Comparative Analysis,
27 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 285, 328 (2013) (noting that the “international standard does not
make a distinction between legal and illegal or short-term and long-term residents” in
the right to a hearing; “[i]t envisions a situation whereby every alien may be given a
right to a hearing before she is expelled”).
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deportation proceedings.”116 Noncitizens like Manuel are thus
entitled to due process, including an opportunity “to make
arguments on [their] own behalf”117 and a “fundamentally fair
removal hearing.”118 In addition, noncitizens like Manuel should
be afforded equal treatment under the law and should not be
subjected to arbitrary and capricious decision-making. In
keeping with these principles, noncitizens like Manuel should
thus be provided with access to a reasonable fear screening.
A.

Due Process Requires a Meaningful Opportunity to Be
Heard

As the Supreme Court explained in Mathews v. Eldridge,
“[t]he fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity
to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”119
The Court stressed that “[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands,”
weighing three factors: (1) the private interest affected, (2) the
risk of deprivation of this interest under existing procedures and
the value of any additional procedural safeguards, and (3) the
interest of the government, including the financial and
administrative costs of additional procedural requirements.120
Where individuals with prior unexecuted removal orders
face summary deportation years after the removal order was
entered, the private interest affected by the official action is
clear, since individuals may face torture or even death if forcibly
returned to their countries of origin. The Supreme Court itself
has emphasized that “deportation is a drastic measure and at
times the equivalent of banishment or exile.”121 In the in absentia
removal context, particularly, the risk is high that the
116 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993); see Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
693 (2001) (“[O]nce an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due
Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether
their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”); Bridges v. Wixon, 326
U.S. 135, 154 (1945); United States v. Lopez-Chavez, 757 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 2014);
see also Koh, Waiving Due Process, supra note 85, at 487–88.
117 Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001).
118 Leslie v. Att’y Gen., 611 F.3d 171, 181 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that Fifth
Amendment and immigration statute allow for right to counsel of choice); Ibarra-Flores
v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 614, 620 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The Fifth Amendment guarantees due
process in deportation proceedings[, and therefore] an alien who faces deportation is
entitled to a full and fair hearing of his claims and a reasonable opportunity to present
evidence on his behalf.” (citations omitted)); Amadou v. INS, 226 F.3d 724, 726–27 (6th
Cir. 2000) (noting that noncitizens have a “due process right to a full and fair hearing”).
119 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
120 Id. at 334–35 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
121 Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948).
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government will deport individuals eligible for protection under
the Refugee Convention or CAT, without giving them the
opportunity to apply for these or other forms of relief.122
The government’s interest in preserving finality, efficiency,
and not accruing additional costs with the adoption of new
procedures in an already backlogged and overburdened system is
clear as well.123 Yet in Mathews, the Court emphasized that
“[f]inancial cost alone is not a controlling weight in determining
whether due process requires a particular safeguard prior to some
administrative decision.”124 Although the Court noted that the cost
of an additional safeguard can at times outweigh the benefit,125 the
Court focused its analysis on times when judicial procedures are
necessary to ensure that procedures are fair.126 Federal circuit
courts of appeal have echoed this reasoning when reviewing
immigration judge decisions, noting the importance of hearing
“claims out fully and fairly.”127
However, unlike in Mathews, where established procedures
provide a “meaningful opportunity” to be heard as well as “an
effective process” and “assure a right to an evidentiary hearing,”128
no such assurances or evidentiary hearings are available to
individuals with prior unexecuted removal orders. As Jennifer Lee
Koh has noted, the statutory rights that apply to immigration
proceedings “only become a reality when the immigrant appears
for a court hearing.”129
The Court in In re Gault warned of the consequences of
failing to safeguard due process, and the “instances, which might
122 See Koh, Waiving Due Process, supra note 85, at 528 (applying Mathews and
describing the risks of deportation in the stipulated removal context). Although it is
difficult to know exactly how many of those with prior, unexecuted removal orders might
be eligible for immigration relief, in FY 2016, approximately forty percent of cases
presented in immigration court resulted in either a grant of immigration relief, voluntary
departure, or termination. See FY 2016: STATISTICS YEARBOOK, supra note 76, at C2, C4,
O1 (twelve percent of cases in FY 2016 resulted in relief from removal, eight percent in
voluntary departure, and twenty percent were terminated). In the stipulated removal
context, Jennifer Lee Koh calculated that EOIR’s statistics suggested that almost fortyfive percent of those who pursued their cases in front of an IJ received “an outcome better
than a formal removal order.” Koh, Waiving Due Process, supra note 85, at 536.
123 See TRACIMMIGRATION, supra note 16.
124 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 973 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Ibarra-Flores v.
Gonzales, 439 F.3d 614, 620–21 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The BIA’s decision will be reversed on
due process grounds if (1) the proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that the alien was
prevented from reasonably presenting his case, and (2) the alien demonstrates prejudice,
which means that the outcome of the proceeding may have been affected by the alleged
violation.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
128 Matthews, 424 U.S. at 349.
129 Koh, Waiving Due Process, supra note 85, at 488.
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have been avoided, of unfairness to individuals”130—unfairness
epitomized by the summary removal of individuals with
unexecuted removal orders entered in absentia or without a full
understanding of the situation facing the individual if forced to
return. As the Court noted in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, the “loss of
liberty entailed is a serious deprivation requiring that the
[individual] be accorded due process.”131
Individuals the government apprehends based on prior
unexecuted removal orders despite living in the United States
for years generally do not have the opportunity to present their
fears of return to an adjudicator. Such would have been the case
with hundreds of Iraqis and Somalis summarily targeted for
deportation in 2017 and 2018, if the ACLU and the University
of Miami Immigration Clinic, among others, had not filed legal
challenges to stay their removal. District courts in Michigan and
Florida recognized the irreparable harm these individuals faced
and stayed their deportations to provide them with time to
submit motions to reopen.132
Yet, even with the additional time, the cumbersome
motion to reopen process does not provide a “meaningful”
opportunity to be heard.133 Accordingly, additional protections in
the form of a pre-removal screening procedure, discussed further
below, offer the government significant benefits in terms of the
“accurate and lawful adjudication of removal cases” that
outweigh any costs.134 As Professor Jill E. Family has noted,
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 19 (1967).
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781, 790–91 (1973) (noting that “fundamental
fairness” is “the touchstone of due process” and finding that that where there was neither a
preliminary nor a final hearing, revocation of probation did not meet due process standards).
132 See Plaintiffs/Petitioners’ Emergency Motion to Expand Order Staying
Removal to Protect Nationwide Class of Iraqi Nationals Facing Imminent Removal to
Iraq at 2, Hamama v. Adducci, 258 F. Supp. 3d 828 (E.D. Mich. 2017) (No. 17-cv-11910MAG-DRG), http://www.aclumich.org/sites/default/files/Hamama_Motion_to_Expand_
Stay_of_Removal.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2RK-HZXS] (noting that “the Petitioners face
irreparable harm given the ‘significant chance of loss of life and lesser forms of
persecution’ which ‘far outweighs any conceivable interest the Government might have
in the immediate enforcement of the removal orders’”); Order Extending Stay of
Enforcement of Removal Orders Pending Court’s Review of Jurisdiction, 258 F. Supp. 3d
828 (E.D. Mich. 2017), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/17-1
1910_hamama_order_extending_stay.pdf [https://perma.cc/NLD7-BYAQ]; see also Mila
Koumpilova, Case of Botched ICE Flight to Somalia Signals Legal Shift on Deportations,
STAR TRIBUNE (Feb. 7, 2018), http://www.startribune.com/case-of-botched-ice-flight-tosomalia-signals-legal-shift-on-deportations/473252303/ [https://perma.cc/32GG-848L];
Class Action for 92 Somalis – Immigration Clinic Files Suit, MIAMI U. SCH. L. (May 16,
2018), law.miami.edu/news/2018/may/class-action-92-somalis-immigration-clinic-filessuit [https://perma.cc/3BD3-2RBF].
133 See supra Section II.A.
134 Koh, Waiving Due Process, supra note 85, at 538 (noting that “the government
has a strong interest in the accurate and lawful adjudication of removal cases,” as well as
in principles of “family unity, economic growth, and humanitarian concerns” and
130
131
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“[a]voiding adjudication devalues the accuracy objective,” and
“[t]he search for truth” necessarily “take[s] the backseat in a
process that steers individuals away from ever accessing the
adjudication system.”135
To be sure, courts have found that in absentia removal
proceedings do not violate principles of due process,136 and people
living in the United States for years with unexecuted removal
orders could have attempted to reopen their cases earlier,
potentially leading individuals to express a fear of return where
they may not have one. But statute and regulations impose
harsh penalties, including fines, potential jail time, as well as a
bar to eligibility for any immigration relief, on individuals who
file frivolous asylum claims, which should deter misuse of the
screening mechanism. In any event, the costs of violating the
non-refoulement principle by deporting refugees to torture or
death far outweigh the costs incurred from any potential misuse
of the additional procedures.
B.

Equal Protection Principles and the Administrative
Procedures Act Require Access to Reasonable Fear
Screenings for Individuals with Unexecuted Removal
Orders

The arbitrary distinctions drawn between those with
removal orders who have been deported and reenter and those
who reside in the United States with prior orders but have never
left violate equal protection principles. Federal courts have
noted that “individuals within a particular group”—in this case
those with prior removal orders—“may not be subjected to
disparate treatment on criteria wholly unrelated to any
legitimate governmental interest.”137 In the situations at hand,
there is no legitimate government interest in drawing
distinctions between those with prior orders who left and
reentered and those who remained.
As the Second Circuit noted in Francis, “[r]eason and
fairness would suggest that an alien whose ties with this country
are so strong that he has never departed after his initial entry
should receive at least as much consideration as an individual
emphasizing that “[o]nce the costs of the current stipulated removal procedure are exposed,
it becomes clear that the alternatives are far less costly”).
135 Family, supra note 1, at 635.
136 See, e.g., Shah v. INS, 788 F.2d 970, 971–72 (4th Cir. 1986) (upholding
immigration judge’s in absentia removal of a Pakistani, reasoning, inter alia, that
petitioner had a reasonable opportunity to be present at the deportation hearing); Patel
v. INS, 803 F.2d 804, 805–07 (5th Cir. 1986) (same as to Indian petitioner).
137 Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 1976).
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who may leave and return from time to time.”138 Similarly, in
Judalang v. Holder, Mr. Judalang, a lawful permanent resident
charged under the aggravated felony crime of violence ground of
deportability, argued, and the Supreme Court agreed, that the
comparable grounds policy, which arbitrarily distinguished
between those who remained in the country and those who left
and attempted to reenter in terms of eligibility for discretionary
212(c) relief was arbitrary and capricious under the
Administrative Procedures Act.139
The Court found that under the comparable grounds
policy, the Board improperly limited eligibility for discretionary
212(c) relief from removal based on the grounds of deportability
the individual was charged under, despite precedent establishing
that lawful permanent residents facing either deportability or
inadmissibility charges could seek 212(c) relief. The Court
explained that “[b]y hinging a deportable alien’s eligibility for
discretionary relief on the chance correspondence between
statutory categories—a matter irrelevant to the alien’s fitness to
reside in this country—the BIA has failed to exercise its discretion
in a reasoned manner.”140 The Court went on to conclude that “[a]
method for disfavoring deportable [as opposed to inadmissible]
aliens that . . . neither focuses on nor relates to an alien’s fitness
to remain in the country—is arbitrary and capricious.”141
Thus, the current distinctions in the law between those with
prior removal orders who are covered by the reasonable fear process
and those who are not, like the distinctions in Francis and Judalang,
have no rational basis and are arbitrary and capricious.142

138 Id.; see also In re Silva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26, 30 (B.I.A. 1976) (“In light of the
constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection of the law, it is our
position that no distinction shall be made between permanent resident aliens who
temporarily proceed abroad and non-departing permanent resident aliens.”).
139 Implications of Judulang v Holder for LPRs seeking § 212(c) Relief and for
Other Individuals Challenging Arbitrary Agency Policies, NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT (Dec.
16, 2011), https://americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/practice_advisory/J
udulang-212-c-relief.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TJ4-S4BG]. For an in-depth discussion of
Judulang in the context of reinstatement of removal and expedited, see generally Koh,
When Shadow Removals Collide, supra note 1; Kate Aschenbrenner Rodriguez,
Irreconcilable Similarities: The Inconsistent Analysis of 212(c) and 212(h) Waivers, 69
OKLA. L. REV. 111 (2017).
140 Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 53 (2011).
141 Id. at 55.
142 See Song v. INS, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that
congressional decisions which draw distinctions between immigrants can be invalidated
under the Equal Protection Clause if there is no rational basis for the distinction).
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Unlike the cumbersome motion to reopen process, the
reasonable fear screening process affords individuals facing
removal from the United States a relatively straightforward
mechanism through which to express their fears of persecution or
torture to a USCIS asylum officer. Yet by failing to extend
protection to individuals subject to unexecuted removal orders, the
current reasonable fear regulations do not adequately safeguard
individuals who fear persecution and torture in their home
countries.143 As discussed supra, current procedures are thus out of
step with U.S. obligations under the Refugee Convention and CAT,
as well as principles of due process and equal protection.144
A.

Expansion of the Reasonable Fear Process and the Need
for Additional Safeguards

The reasonable fear process should be expanded to all
those with prior removal orders—including outstanding orders
that have not yet been executed—who fear return to their home
countries. In its overview of the reasonable fear process on the
143 Moreover, the reasonable fear regulations unnecessarily restrict the protection
available to those with prior removal orders to withholding of removal under section
241(b)(3) and under CAT, barring them from asylum. Although extensive discussion of this
issue is beyond the scope of this paper, advocates have long argued that the reasonable fear
process should be expanded to allow for immigrants to apply for asylum, as well. For
further discussion of this issue, see, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae American Immigration
Lawyers Association et al., Perez-Guzman v. Holder, No. 13-70579 (9th Cir. Apr. 9, 2014);
Letter to Jeh Johnson from Asylum and Immigration Law Practitioners and Scholars (Mar.
2014) (on file with author) (noting that “[i]n New Orleans, ICE officials have asserted to
advocates that they have the authority to remove [E- G-V- A#], who was originally granted
voluntary departure more than 10 years ago and has remained in the United States,
without referring him to USCIS for a reasonable fear interview”). Mr. G-V- was ultimately
removed, despite the filing of a motion to reopen by the New Orleans Workers’ Center for
Racial Justice, which engaged in extensive advocacy on this issue.
144 A report filed by U.S. NGOs with the United Nations Committee Against
Torture emphasized that “[t]he United States regularly fails in its obligation under
Article 3 of the CAT to respect the right to nonrefoulement in its immigration laws,
policies and practices.” ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & DET. WATCH NETWORK,
VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 3 AND 16 RIGHTS OF REFUGEES, ASYLUM SEEKERS AND NONCITIZENS 1 (Nov. 28, 2014), http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CAT/Shared%20Docum
ents/USA/INT_CAT_CSS_USA_18567_E.pdf [https://perma.cc/D49A-9JJP] (noting that
“[s]ome violations result from the statutory framework itself, while others are a matter
of administrative policy, agency practice or lack of accountability for individual bad
actors”). The report cites the U.S.’s failure to create “an adequate legal mechanism
implementing fully the obligations of Article 3,” criticizing the government’s use of
“mandatory removal . . . without a discretionary hearing in a broad category of cases”
and summary deportation procedures for their violations of “non-citizens’ rights to due
process, access to counsel, presentation of their case before a judge, and other
fundamental safeguards of fairness.” Id. at 3, 6, 7.
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USCIS website, the agency recognizes that ICE “may not remove
individuals to a country where they are ‘more likely than not’
going to be persecuted and tortured”145 and states, “[i]f you have
been ordered removed and you express a fear of returning to the
country to which you have been ordered removed, ICE must refer
your case to an asylum officer who will determine whether you
have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture.”146 U.S.
obligations under the Refugee Convention and CAT mandate this
more expansive interpretation of the reasonable fear process.
Although the expansion of the reasonable fear process to
those who have not yet left the country would involve additional
resources from the USCIS Asylum Office, which conducts those
screenings, cost alone cannot, as noted, excuse lack of compliance
with constitutional requirements or international and domestic
obligations of non-refoulement.147 Nor can the government’s
interests in finality and efficiency be considered separate from the
high costs that come with detention and deportation of refugees
who have valid claims for relief.148
The government must invest further resources in the
hiring and training of asylum officers to ensure that such
screenings can be conducted efficiently and effectively, providing
a more fundamentally fair process for individuals who fear
return to serious harm, torture, or even death. An expansion of
reasonable fear screenings, in lieu of the motion to reopen
process, would also make the process easier to navigate for
applicants, the majority of whom are pro se.149
In developing this system, the United States should draw
on the Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA) process in Canada,
wherein screenings are offered to those who are “removal ready”
and their removals are stayed to allow for assessment of their
fears of return. Similarly, individuals who reside in the United
States for years after they are ordered removed should
periodically be afforded access to reasonable fear screenings. Such
a pre-removal risk assessment would safeguard the rights of
refugees and ensure that the critical reasonable fear safety valve
is applied equitably to all noncitizens.

Questions & Answers: Reasonable Fear Screenings, supra note 112.
Id. When an asylum officer determines that an individual has a fear of
persecution or torture, the individual can then seek either withholding of removal or
deferral of removal in a hearing before an immigration judge. Id.
147 See supra Part II.
148 See supra Section II.A.
149 See supra Section II.B.
145
146
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What the United States Can Learn from Other Countries

As noted above, state parties to the Refugee Convention
and CAT are obligated to establish procedures to guarantee
effective protection against return to persecution or torture for
noncitizens on a case-by-case basis prior to removal.150 The
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) provided the
following guidance regarding the required procedures in Hirsi
Jamaa and others v. Italy, explaining that:
For the refugee-status determination procedure to be individual, fair
and effective, it must necessarily have at least the following features:
(1) a reasonable time-limit in which to submit the asylum application;
(2) a personal interview with the asylum applicant before the decision
on the application is taken;
(3) the opportunity to submit evidence in support of the application
and dispute evidence submitted against the application;
(4) a fully reasoned written decision by an independent first-instance
body, based on the asylum-seeker’s individual situation . . . ;
(5) a reasonable time-limit in which to appeal against the decision . . . ;
(6) full and speedy judicial review . . . ; and
(7) free legal advice and representation and, if necessary, free
linguistic assistance . . . .151

The ECHR in Hirsi Jamaa explained that “[t]he duty not
to refoule is . . . recognized as applying to refugees irrespective
of their formal recognition.”152 It noted that the duty
“encompasses any measure attributable to a State which could
have the effect of returning an asylum-seeker or refugee to the
frontiers of territories where his or her life or freedom would be
threatened, or where he or she would risk persecution.”153
In his concurring opinion in Hirsi Jamaa, Judge Pinto de
Albuquerque emphasized that the principle of non-refoulement
applies both “to those who have not yet had their status
declared . . . and even to those who have not expressed their wish
150 Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R.
97, 150, 158–59 (2012) (citing the importance of procedural guarantees to protect the
human rights of refugees and noting that “UNHCR stated that the principle of nonrefoulement involved procedural obligations for States”).
151 Id. at 180.
152 Id. at 113 (holding that Somali and Eritrean immigrants being intercepted
by Italian authorities in the high seas and being returned was contrary to the principle
of non-refoulement).
153 Id. (emphasis added).
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to be protected” given the absolute duty to protect against
refoulement, and therefore, “neither the absence of an explicit
request for asylum nor the lack of substantiation of the asylum
application with sufficient evidence may absolve the State
concerned of the non-refoulement obligation.”154 In so doing, he
underscored the key principle that state parties have an
obligation to safeguard individuals against refoulement,
regardless of whether the state has recognized the individual as
a refugee or not.155
The European Asylum Procedures Directive (APD)
recognizes the need for “effective access to procedures, the
opportunity to cooperate and properly communicate with the
competent authorities so as to present the relevant facts . . . and
sufficient procedural guarantees to pursue” a claim for
protection.156 The APD mandates that individuals who express a
fear of return be accorded a personal interview, along with “an
adequate opportunity to present elements needed to substantiate
the application . . . as completely as possible.”157 The European
Qualification Directive similarly requires the assessment of fears
of return on an individual basis, taking into account the relevant
facts regarding the personal circumstances of the applicant, the
country of origin, statements and documents presented by the
applicant, if any, among other criteria.158
154 Id. at 170–71 (separate opinion by Pinto de Albuquerque, J.); see also Chahal
v. UK, App. No. 22414/93, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 24–25 (1996) (noting that “the Court’s
examination of the existence of a real risk of ill-treatment must necessarily be a rigorous
one, in view of the absolute character of Article 3 (art. 3) and the fact that it enshrines one
of the fundamental values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe”).
155 See Case C-534/11, Arslan v. Czech Republic, 2013 E.C.R. 225/21 (May 30,
2013) (concluding that if a person applied for asylum after he was detained and ordered
removed then the state must determine his application before removal).
156 Directive 2013/32/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 26
June 2013, on Common Procedures for Granting and Withdrawing International
Protection, 2013 O.J. (L 180) ¶ 25 (emphasis added) [hereinafter APD 2013].
157 Id. at art. 16; see also id. at art. 40.2 (noting that “a subsequent application for
international protection shall be subject first to a preliminary examination as to whether
new elements or findings have arisen or have been presented by the applicant”). But see id.
¶ 36 (“Where an applicant makes a subsequent application without presenting new
evidence or arguments, it would be disproportionate to oblige Member States to carry out
a new full examination procedure. In those cases, Member States should be able to dismiss
an application as inadmissible in accordance with the res judicata principle.”).
158 Directive 2011/95/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13
December 2011, on Standards for the Qualification of Third-Country Nationals or
Stateless Persons as Beneficiaries of International Protection, for a Uniform Status for
Refugees or for Persons Eligible for Subsidiary Protection, and for the Content of the
Protection Granted, 2011 O.J. (L 337) 9, 14, art. 4; see also UNHCR Research Project on
Improving Asylum Procedures: Comparative Analysis and Recommendations for Law
and Practice, sec. IV (Mar. 2010) (outlining the requirements for a personal interview).
The ECHR has also repeatedly emphasized the special circumstances of asylum seekers,
and the need to accord them the benefit of the doubt. See, e.g., Affaire Singh et autres c.
Belgique [Singh and others v. Belgium], App. No. 33210/11, (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 2, 2012);
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Furthermore, the “right to be heard” is recognized as “part
of the general principles of EU law” and “is affirmed in Article 41
of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, which provides
for the ‘right of every person to be heard, before any individual
measure which would affect him or her adversely is taken.’”159
Additionally, “Article 13 of the ECHR requires a remedy with
automatic suspensive effect when the implementation of a return
measure against [an asylum applicant or refugee] might have
potentially irreversible effects.”160
Canada has established a PRRA process to supplement
the refugee status determination system, which affords certain
individuals fear screenings prior to removal.161 Individuals are
generally allowed to apply for PRRA protection a year after their
refugee claim was refused and when they have exhausted all
remedies.162 When a person is “removal-ready” the Canada
Border Services Agency provides the individual with a PRRA
application kit and the individual’s removal is stayed to allow
for consideration of the application.163 The PRRA defines the test
for risk broadly as including grounds in the Refugee Convention
and CAT as well as the “risk to life.”164
The United States can look to the Canadian example and
should consider adopting a similar case-by-case pre-removal risk
assessment screening procedure for individuals who have
unexecuted removal orders. Doing so would be an important step
SF and others v. Sweden, App. No. 52077/10, ¶¶ 68–69 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 15, 2012); RC
v. Sweden, App. No. 418277/077, ¶ 50 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 9, 2010); Saadi v. Italy, App.
No. 37201/06, ¶ 129 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 28, 2008); Collins and Akaziebie v. Sweden, App.
No. 23944/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 8, 2007); Matsiukhina and Matsiukhin v. Sweden, App.
No. 31260/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 21, 2005).
159 U.N.
HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, BEYOND PROOF: CREDIBILITY
ASSESSMENT IN EU ASYLUM SYSTEMS 121 (May 2013) (emphasis omitted).
160 European Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe, European Union
Agency for Fundamental Rights, Handbook on European Law Relating to Asylum,
Borders and Immigration 115 (2014).
161 See BENJAMIN R. DOLIN & MARGARET YOUNG, LAW AND GOVERNMENT DIVISION,
BP-185E, CANADA’S REFUGEE PROTECTION SYSTEM 15 (Oct. 2002); Pre-removal Risk
Assessment—Refugee Claims in Canada, CANADA.CA, https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration
-refugees-citizenship/services/refugees/claim-protection-inside-canada/after-apply-nextsteps/refusal-options/pre-removal-risk-assessment.html [https://perma.cc/43Y8-MCK2].
162 Processing Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA) Applications: Intake,
CANADA.CA, https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/publica
tions-manuals/operational-bulletins-manuals/refugee-protection/removal-risk-assessment
/applications-intake.html [https://perma.cc/HWE4-CJ5Q]; see DOLIN & YOUNG, supra note
161, at 15 (noting that individuals granted protection through Canada’s PRRA process are
also eligible for permanent residence).
163 Processing Pre-Removal Risk Assessment Applications, supra note 162.
164 DOLIN & YOUNG, supra note 161, at 15; see also Guide 5523 – Applying for a
Pre-Removal Risk Assessment, CANADA.CA, https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-ref
ugees-citizenship/services/application/application-forms-guides/guide-5523-applyingremoval-risk-assessment.html [https://perma.cc/3VK2-GGAV].
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toward fulfilling U.S. obligations not to return individuals to
countries where they fear persecution or torture.
CONCLUSION
Implementation of such a pre-removal risk assessment
screening for those with unexecuted removal orders would
rectify a fundamental inequity in the current system that
existing scholarship has not yet highlighted: the disparate
treatment of immigrants with prior removal orders who remain
in the United States, as compared to immigrants with prior
removal orders who are deported and then reenter.
Although those residing in the United States with
unexecuted orders should have had their fears of return heard
and adjudicated prior to an immigration judge ordering them
removed in the first place, the shortage of adequate legal
representation and other systemic flaws mean that this is not
often the case. Some may never have had their day in court, if,
for example, like Manuel, they were too traumatized to appear
or their hearing notices were lost in a bureaucratic shuffle.
Others may not have understood the forms of relief available to
them or may not have been able to open up fully about their past
harm, given the lasting effects of the trauma suffered. Even if
they had a court hearing, it might have been truncated or
incomplete.
A universal reasonable fear screening prior to removal
would protect against improper return of immigrants to
persecution and torture in contravention of domestic and
international obligations under the Refugee Convention and
CAT. While it may be tempting to dismiss individuals with prior
orders who express a fear of return as merely looking for a
second bite at the apple or as fabricating claims where they have
none, the imposition of harsh penalties—including fines, jail
time, and bars against eligibility for any immigration relief—for
filing frivolous claims for protection, as mandated under current
law, would likely deter such abuse of this system.
Given that the mechanism for such reasonable
screenings already exists in the reinstatement (as well as
administrative) removal context, it would not require the
establishment of new procedures, but rather a change in policy
to allow for the application of reasonable fear screenings to
individuals with prior unexecuted removal orders. The United
States, like its counterparts in Europe and Canada, has a
responsibility to fully comply with its non-refoulement
obligations and must take additional steps to prevent the
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return of bona fide refugees to countries where they would face
persecution, torture, or even death. Extending the reasonable
fear process to individuals with prior unexecuted removal
orders would also comport with principles of due process and
equal protection and ensure that all immigrants who fear for
their lives are afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

